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ABSTRACT 
Tribal-State Gaming Compacts and Revenue Sharing Provisions: 
Are the States Upping the Ante? 
By: Richard L. Skeen 
 
In the ten years following, the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 
Indian Gaming has grown to over a $19 billion a year industry, in 26 States, involving over 241 
Approved Class III Tribal Gaming Ordinances.  States have been eager to get a piece of this 
ever-increasing pie.  Some commentators have predicted  that States will be reluctant to enter 
into new compacts or renew existing compacts,  however, other’s have indicated that States will 
continue to demand a percentages of Gaming revenues. 
 
This comment addresses the central issue of whether the Tribal-State compacts entered 
into subsequent to the Seminole Tribe decision are valid reimbursements for fees expended in the 
regulation of Indian Gaming and bargained for exclusivity or whether the States are imposing an 
illegal tax on tribal enterprises engaged upon tribal lands.  The development of Indian Gaming in 
the United States, sovereignty issues and the extent of the a state’s authority to tax Indian Tribes 
set the stage for laying the analytical framework for determining whether assessments contained 
in the Tribal-State compacts are a fee or a tax.  Recent developments in the law set the stage for a 
review of various Tribal-State compacts and an analysis of the legality of their revenue sharing 
provisions.  The comment details tribal plans for sustaining future independence in light of the 
current trend of States to demand increasing proportions of Tribal Gaming revenue.  In summary, 
the comment addresses the status and direction of tribal-state revenue sharing provisions.   
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Tribal-State Gaming Compacts and Revenue Sharing Provisions:  
Are the States Upping the Ante?  
Richard L. Skeen
I. Introduction  
The Indian Gaming industry developed in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians and the subsequent enactment of the Indian 
Gaming Regulation Act, which together established Tribal governmental authority to operate a 
gaming industry without state regulation; provided that, the state in which the Tribal gaming 
takes places also authorizes some form of gaming.1 The Indian Gaming and Regulatory Act of 
1988 (IGRA), requires states to enter into negotiations with Indian Tribes for compacts 
authorizing the operation of Class III gaming.2 However, the various tribes’ barging chips under 
the Act have been diminished, in part, by the Supreme Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida which held that states are immune from suit (under the 11th amendment doctrine of 
sovereign immunity) by Indian tribes for the state’s failure to negotiate in good faith as required 
under the IGRA. 3
 The author is, currently employed at the law firm of Korn and Zehmer PA. in Ponte Vedra Florida; licensed in 
Ohio and admission is pending in Florida; he received his B.S.B.A. from The Ohio State University, J.D. from the 
University of Tulsa, where he was a managing editor and articles editor for the Tulsa Journal of Comparative and 
International Law, and received his LL.M in Taxation from the University of Florida, where he was a graduate 
assistant.  
 
1 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) [hereinafter Cabazon]. 
2 25 U.S.C.A. § § 2701 – 2721 (2006). 
3 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) [hereinafter Seminole Tribe]. 
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In the ten years following the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 
Indian gaming has grown to over a $19 billion a year industry,4 in 26 states,5 involving over 241 
Approved Class III Tribal Gaming Ordinances.6 States have been eager to get a piece of this 
ever-increasing pie, however, some commentators have predicted that following the Seminole 
Tribe case, states will be reluctant to enter into new compacts or renew existing compacts.7
Other’s postulate that states will continue to demand increasing percentages of gaming revenues 
in the renewed Tribal-State compacts, resulting in spiraling costs borne by Tribes, way out of 
proportion to the regulatory fee collectable provided for in the IGRA.   
This comment addresses the central issue of whether the Tribal-State compacts entered 
into subsequent to the Seminole Tribe decision are valid reimbursements for fees expended in the 
regulation of Indian gaming and bargained for exclusivity or whether the states are imposing an 
illegal tax on tribal enterprises engaged upon tribal lands. Part II discusses the historical 
progression of the legalization and development of Indian gaming in the United States.  Part III 
discusses sovereignty issues related to Indian tribes and the extent of a state’s authority to 
imposes taxes on such tribes. Additionally Part III will discuss the analytical framework for 
approaching the determination of whether an assessment is a fee or a tax.  Part IV discusses 
recent developments in the law. Part V undertakes and analytical review of several types of 
Tribal-State compacts.  In Part VI the author comments on one tribe’s plan to sustain future 
independence and in summary postulates on the status and direction of tribal-state revenue 
sharing provisions.  The vast array of Tribal-State compacts, which differ in style and substance, 
 
4 NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING COMMISSION, TRIBAL GAMING REVENUES, available at:
http://www.nigc.gov/TribalData/GamingRevenues20042000/tabid/549/Default.aspx [hereinafter NIGC] (last viewed 
5-16-06).  
5 NIGC, GAMING TRIBE REPORT, available at: http://www.nigc.gov. (last viewed 5-16-06). 
6 67 Fed Reg. 54823 (August 26, 2002). 
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make an overall assessment difficult, but the current trend of states to exact an increasing amount 
of revenue from tribal gaming operations appears to be approach the end of the continuum in 
which revenue sharing can be considered proportional to the benefits received by the tribes.  
II. Historical Perspective 
A. California v. Cabazon 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the Case of California v. Cabazon Band of 
Mission Indians in 1986. 8 The case involved California’s attempt to apply provisions of its 
penal code limiting gaming to the conduct of draw poker and bingo by the Cabazon Tribe on 
tribal lands.9 The court held that the state’s civil jurisdiction over Indian activities was limited, 
but the state’s criminal jurisdiction in relation to Indian lands was far-reaching, pursuant to 
Public Law 280.10 The court developed a test to determine whether a law was regulatory vs. 
criminal by looking to see if, in this instance, the gaming at issue is against the state’s policy and 
therefore criminal.11 The court-analyzed California’s gaming laws and noted that California 
permitted gambling operations by other entities, such as charities, and in fact even promoted 
gambling thorough the California State Lottery.12 Thus, the court determined that the gaming law 
was regulatory rather than criminal because gaming was not against the policy of the state to 
prohibit all gaming.13 
In 1988 Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) which, in effect 
statutorily ratified the Cabazon decision by limiting State regulation of gaming on Indian lands 
 
7 Eric S. Lent, Are States Beating The House?: The Validity of Tribal-State Revenue Sharing Under the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act., 91 GEO. L. J. 451, 452 (2003). 
8 See generally Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202. 
9 Id. 
10 Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209. (In Public Law 280 Congress expressly granted criminal jurisdiction to six states 
including California over crimes committed by or to Indians in Indian country within the state’s boarders). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 211. 
13 Id. 
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to instances where the activity is deemed criminal.14 Similar to Cabazon decision, under the 
IGRA, Tribes may engage in and self regulate certain gaming activities as long as the state in 
which the active is conducted has authorized the gaming activities for any other purpose, such as 
for charitable or fraternal organizations; and thus the states policy is regulatory.15 
B. IGRA 
The IGRA’s purpose and policy according to 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2702 is to establish clear 
standards and regulations for gaming conducted on tribal lands, in order to foster economic 
development and fortify tribal governments, where gaming is not specifically prohibited by state 
or federal law.16 The underlying policy of the IGRA is to establish a federal regulatory authority, 
standards, and to create the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC).17 Thus, congress 
enacted the IGRA to display its intent to federally occupy the area of law consisting of the 
regulation Indian gaming pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers.18 
Section 2703 of the IGRA defines the types of gaming which are subject to state and/or 
federal regulation.  Class I gaming includes social or historical forms of tribal gaming with 
minimal value prizes.19 Class II gaming includes bingo and related card games explicitly 
authorized by state statute and played in accordance with state regulations.20 Class II type games 
(which can be electronic slot machine style) consists of persons playing against others playing 
the same games or slot machines, which are connected electronically to one another.  The 
persons are not playing against the house odds in Class II gaming.  Class III gaming includes all 
 
14IOWA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE TO THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT, available at:
http://www.legis.state.ia.us/Central /LSB/Guides/indgam.htm#pt1(last viewed 5-16-06); 25 U.S.C.A. § § 2701(5), 
2710(b)(1)(A) , (d)(1)(B); See also U.S. v. Sisseton-Wahpenton Sioux Tribe, 897 F.2d 358, 366 (8th Cir. 1990). 
15 see infra Part III.B; see also 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710 (a)-(d); see also Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209-210. 
16 25 U.S.C.A. § § 2701(5), 2702. 
17 25 U.S.C.A. § 2702. 
18 See U.S. CONST. ART. 1 § 8 CL. 3. 
19 25 U.S.C.A. § 2703 (6) 
20 25 U.S.C.A. § 2703 (7). 
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other forms of gambling (such as independent slot machines, poker, blackjack, craps, roulette, 
etc.) not described in Classes I or II.21 
Class I gaming is in the sole jurisdiction of the tribe and not subject to regulation under 
the IGRA.22 Class II gaming is subject to exclusive tribal jurisdiction provided it is conducted on 
Indian lands, within a state permitting such gaming for the purposes of any entity or person and 
the tribe adopts an ordinance or resolution concerning the conduct of such Class II gaming.23 
Under the IGRA so long as a tribe passes regulatory ordinances, which are approved by the BIA, 
it may regulate the time place and manner of Class II gaming which is otherwise authorized in 
the state in which it is conducted.  However, Class III gaming is allowed on Indian lands only if 
it is authorized by tribal ordinance, located in a state permitting such gaming for any persons, 
and is conducted pursuant to a Tribal-State Compact approved by the Chairman of the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA).24 
The subject matter of the Tribal-State compact may include application of criminal and 
civil regulations of the tribe and state related to such Class III gaming activities and allocation of 
jurisdiction of the forgoing between the tribe and state.25 The compact may also include 
assessment by the state of such activities in an amount necessary to defray regulatory costs,
provisions governing taxation of such activities by the Indian tribe in amount comparable to that 
assessed by the state on similar activities, remedies for breach, standards of operation and other 
subjects directly related to gaming activities:  
(C) Any Tribal-State compact negotiated under subparagraph (A) may include 
provisions relating to-- 
 
21 25 U.S.C.A. § 2703(8). 
22 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(a)(1). 
23 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(b). 
24 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d). 
25 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d)(3)(C). 
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(i) the application of the criminal and civil laws and regulations of the Indian tribe 
or the State that are directly related to, and necessary for, the licensing and 
regulation of such activity; 
(ii) the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the State and the 
Indian tribe necessary for the enforcement of such laws and regulations; 
(iii) the assessment by the State of such activities in such amounts as are 
necessary to defray the costs of regulating such activity; 
(iv) taxation by the Indian tribe of such activity in amounts comparable to 
amounts assessed by the State for comparable activities; 
(v) remedies for breach of contract; 
(vi) standards for the operation of such activity and maintenance of the gaming 
facility, including licensing; and 
(vii) any other subjects that are directly related to the operation of gaming 
activities.26 
The IGRA also requires states to enter into good faith negotiations with tribes.27 The statute 
provides for a variety of enforcement remedies when a tribe and state fail to agree on the subject 
matter of a Tribal-State Compact.28 Under the IGRA tribes could sue a state in federal court for 
refusing to enter into negotiations or for failing to negotiate in good faith, however, tribal 
remedies to sue states under the IGRA were largely eviscerated by the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.
In approving Tribal-State compacts, the Department of the Interior generally requires that 
states must provide “substantial economic benefit” to tribes by offering “more favorable terms” 
for the right to engage in Class III gaming activities.29 Revenue sharing provisions without a 
corresponding  “substantial economic benefit” have been construed as merely a tax prohibited by 
the IGRA § 2710 (d)(4).30 “Substantial exclusivity” is the “substantial economic benefit” most 
widely used by states to justify the revenue sharing provisions because the tribes are considered 
 
26 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d)(3)(C).  
27 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d)(3)(A),(7)(A).  
28 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d) (7)-(9). 
29 See Kevin Grover, Revenue Sharing, part III (Unpublished Paper Presented at the 30th annual Federal Bar 
Association Indian Law Conference), (April 14-15, 2005). 
30 Id at Part III.A.1; See also DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, DISAPPROVAL LETTER FOR ST. REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE 
AND THE STATE OF NEW YORK, July 26, 2000 p.1. 
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to have purchased a “valuable right from the state” in the form of a monopoly on gaming.31 This 
seems to hold true given the Federal district court decision invalidating revenue sharing 
provisions of seven Tribal-State compacts in Michigan after voters authorized Casino Gaming in 
Detroit by non-Indians and the state entered into more compacts with other Indian tribes.32 Thus 
most Tribal-State Compacts must contain provisions invalidating revenue sharing in the event 
the state decides to authorize non-Indian Class III gaming to gain approval.33 
The substantial exclusivity requirement is only the first hurdle for gaining  
Department of the Interior (DOI) approval of Tribal-State Compacts. The DOI also evaluates 
amount of revenue demanded by the states and other entities dealing with the tribes.34 In the past, 
the DOI has required a demonstration of the relationship between the percent of revenue 
demanded and its relation ship to services provided by local governments,35 however, the DOI 
has recently back down from that requirement.36 
C. Seminole Tribe Decision 
In 1991 the Seminole Tribe of Florida filed suit against the state of Florida and the 
Governor to compel negotiations for Class III gaming under the IGRA in the District Court for 
the Southern District of Florida.37 The District Court denied the State’s motion to dismiss and  
Florida appealed the ruling to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the District 
 
31 See Grover, supra note 29, at part III.A.2 
32 Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 93 F. Sup. 2d, 850, 851 (2000); See also Lent, supra note 7, at 459. 
33 Grover, supra note 29, at part III.A.3. 
34 See generally,  25 U.S.C.A. §2711 (c), (2006). 
35 See Grover, supra note 29, at part III.C.4; See also DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, LETTER TO CHITIMACHA TRIBE 
OF LOUISIANA, August 24, 2000. 
36 Grover, supra note 29, at part III.C.4; See also DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, LETTER TO HONORABLE MURPHY 
J. FOSTER, March 30, 2001. 
37 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 801 F.Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992). 
© 2006, Richard Skeen 9
Court’s decision and held the 11th amendment bared suit against the state in federal court.38 
Subsequently certiorari was granted by the U.S. Supreme Court on the issue.39 In Seminole Tribe 
of Florida v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that a State’s immunity to suit under the 11th 
Amendment could not be abrogated by Congress by the enactment of the IGRA under the 
authority of Indian Commerce Clause.40 The court noted that a state’s sovereign immunity 
previously could only be abrogated under the Fourteenth Amendment41 and the Interstate 
Commerce Clause, which is distinguishable from the Indian Commerce Clause.42 Recent 
constitutional jurisprudence has indicated that Congress’s commerce clause powers are rather 
broad and State’s 10th amendment rights will rarely be sufficient grounds for invoking 
sovereignty from federal interference when Congress has explicitly manifested intent to occupy 
and area of law.  However, in Seminole Tribe, the Court expressly overruled the Union Gas 
decision (which previously upheld congressional broad authority under the Commerce Clause) 
noting that such abrogation of a state’s 11th Amendment sovereign immunity under the 
Commerce Clause was greatly divergent form the precedent of constitutional jurisprudence of 
the court.43 Thus under the Court’s current Constitutional jurisprudence, Congress’s Commerce 
Clause power is not sufficient grounds to force states to answer to claims in federal court.  
The Seminole Tribe decision greatly eliminated the Indian tribes’ barging power with 
respect to compelling negotiation for Tribal-State Compacts, by effectively limiting instances 
when the tribes can invoke the enforcement provisions of the IGRA.  Tribes are now forced to 
 
38 See  Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3rd. 1016 (11th Cir.,  1994); (The Circuit Court also dismissed the 
tribes argument that the Ex Parte Young doctrine applied to permit suit against the Governor in his official capacity 
for failure to negotiate basing it decision on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction). 
39 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 115 S.Ct. 932 (1995). 
40 See generally, Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44.  
41 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59; See generally also Fitzpatric v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
42 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59; See generally also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
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negotiate at a disadvantage because the are precluded from suing states to compel negotiation 
(unless the state has expressly waived its right against suit).  
III. Tribal Sovereignty and the Ability of States to Tax Tribal Governments 
A. Sovereignty 
Indian Tribes have an elusive and ambiguous status in the framework of US law.44 Their 
political status is neither that of a domestic state or a foreign nation.45 However, for many 
purposes tribes are considered sovereign nations.46 Chief Justice Marshall characterized tribal 
status as “domestic, dependent nations” and noted the uniqueness of the relationship in the 
Cherokee Nation v. Ga., 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). 
Under The Internal Revenue Code Indian tribal governments and their political 
subdivisions are treated as states for federal tax purposes relating to various deductions, issuance 
of tax exempt bonds, estate taxation, deferred compensation, excises taxes, etc.47 Although no 
direct statutory authority exempts from or subjects Indian tribes to taxation the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS or Service) has long taken the position that tribes and federally charted tribal 
corporations are tax exempt entities for federal tax purposes.48 In fact the Service notes that 
although 26 U.S.C.A. § 61 states all income is taxable regardless of source “The federally 
chartered Indian tribal corporation shares the same tax status as the Indian tribe and is not taxable 
on income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the reservation.”49 In Revenue 
 
43 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 64-66; see generally also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) 
(upholding congressional abrogation of state’s sovereign immunity pursuant to legislation under the commerce 
clause). 
44 RICHARD D. POMP & OLIVER OLDMAN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, Vol. III, pg. 15-1 (5th ed 2005). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 See 26 U.S.C.A. 7871(a)-(d); See also Rubin Ranat, Tribal-State Compacts: Legitimate Or Illegal Taxation Of 
Indian Gaming In California?, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 953, 960-963, 2005. 
48 See Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55,58; See also Rev. Rul. 81-295, 1981-2 C.B. 15, See also Ranat, supra note 
47, at 960-963. 
49 Rev. Rul. 81-295, 1981-2 C.B. 15; See also Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 157, n.13 (1973), 
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Ruling 94-16 the Service held that “[n]either an unincorporate Indian tribe nor a corporation 
organized under section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 is subject to federal income 
tax on its income, regardless of the location of the activities that produced the income.”50 Tribes 
are not taxable entities whether acting as an unincorporated  or federally incorporated entity and 
thus any income earned from any activity is like wise not taxable, “[h]owever, a corporation 
organized by an Indian tribe under state law is subject to federal income tax on its income, 
regardless of the location of the activities that produced the income.”51 Additionally, this is also 
the case for individual Indians; they are subject to tax like any other individual under the Internal 
Revenue Code.52 
It has long been established under Federal Constitutional jurisprudence that States do not 
possess the right to impose income tax on individuals or corporations operation solely on tribal 
lands.53 In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation the Supreme Court declared that 
“[a]bsent explicit congressional direction to the contrary, we presume against a State's having the 
jurisdiction to tax within Indian country, whether the particular territory consists of a formal or 
informal reservation, allotted lands, or dependent Indian communities.” 54 Furthermore, non-
Indians doing business on tribal lands with Indians are generally not subject to taxation by the 
 
50 Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19. 
51 Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19. 
52 See generally 26 U.S.C. § 61 (2006) 
53 In re Kan. Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 761 (1866) (holding state of Kansas did not have authority be impose any species 
of levy, sale, and forfeiture, or a levy and sale for taxes on Indian tribes): See also In re N.Y. Indians, 72 U.S. 761, 
770-771(1866) (holding that the land comprising the Indian reservation is not subject to taxation or levy and sale for 
default on said tax liability as long as title remains in the hands of the tribe);  See also McClanahan v. Arizona State 
Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (holding that by imposing a person income taxation a reservation Indian 
whose entire income derives from reservation sources, the state interfered in matters reserved solely to the province 
of the Federal government and the Indians themselves). See also Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead 
Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (holding that in absences of congressional consent the state was disabled from 
imposing person property tax, vendor license fees, or sales tax on Indians conducting  business on Indian lands); See 
also Ranat, supra note 47, at 963. 
54 Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 128 (1985) 
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state because to do so would infringe upon the tribal government’s sovereignty.55 The Supreme 
Court struck down a state tax imposed on non-Indian corporations registered to do business in 
the state but engaged in operations solely located on an Indian reservation as pre-empted by 
federal law.56 
B. Fee vs. Tax Under the IGRA 57 
The IGRA provides that a Tribal-State compact “may included provisions relating to: . . .  
(iii) the assessment by the state of such activities in such amounts as are necessary to defray the 
cost of regulation such activity; . . . (iv) taxation by the Indian tribe of such activity in amounts 
comparable to amounts assessed by the State for comparable activities”58 The plan language of 
the IGRA only provides that States may assess amount related to reimbursement of cost incurred 
in the course of regulating the Indian gaming industry. Furthermore, the language specifically 
vests the power to tax solely with the tribe itself. The IGRA continues by clarifying the 
aforementioned requirements: “Except for any assessments that may be agreed to under 
paragraph (3)(C)(iii) of this subsection, nothing in this section shall be interpreted as conferring 
upon a State . . . authority to impose any tax, fee, charge, or other assessment upon an Indian 
tribe . . . authorized . . . to engage in a class III activity.”59 The IGRA explicitly denies the states 
the authority to impose taxes, fees or other charges upon Indian tribes other than amounts 
necessary to pay for regulation of class III activities. 
In determining whether an assessment is a fee or a tax, the general rule is; a tax provides 
revenue for the general support of the government while a fee imposes a specific charge for the 
 
55 Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. et al. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982). 
56 White Mountain Apache tribe et al. v. Bracker et al. 448 U.S. 136 (1980), (holding state’s motor carrier licenses 
and use fuel taxes invalid). 
57 See generally also Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463  
58 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d) (3)(C)(iii)-(iv) (emphasis added). 
59 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d) (4). 
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use of public facilities or services.60 The test to determine whether an assessment is a tax or fee 
consist of three criteria: 1) whether the primary purpose of the assessment is regulatory rather 
than revenue raising; 2) whether the assessment is proportionate to the services provided; and 3) 
whether the assessment is for a service voluntarily undertaken by the payor.61 For the purposes 
of intergovernmental immunity fees are voluntary and paid in exchange for a particular defined 
benefit where as taxes, conversely, are imposed by a sovereign without regard to choice and 
generally do not provide specific benefits.62 
Under the rule established in McCulloch v. Maryland, federal instrumentalities  (such as 
federally charted banks or Indian tribes in this case) are generally immune from taxation by a 
state unless such taxation is specifically authorized by Congress.63 In determining whether an 
assessment is a tax under the McCulloch rule the courts will conduct an examination of the 
assessment to determine if it is imposed on a nondiscriminatory manner, whether the assessment 
is a fair approximation of the cost of the benefit received, and whether the assessment is 
formulated to produce revenues that will not exceed the total cost to State of the benefit 
supplied.64 Since the IRGA specifically prohibits taxation by states of Indian tribes the 
assessments in Tribal-State compacts must pass muster under one of the aforementioned tests.  
IV. Recent Developments in Case Law Since the Seminole Tribe Case 
In November of 2004 the Tenth Circuit handing down its decision on appeal from a 
district case involving the Northern Apropos Tribe of Indians who sued the State of Wyoming 
 
60 See generally Jacksonville Port Authority v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 600 So.2nd 1159 (Fla. App. 1 Dist., 1992).  
61 See generally Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W. 2nd 264 (Mich. 1998); See generally also Dean v. Lehman 18 
P.3rd 523 (2001). 
62 See generally City of Vanceburg, Ky., Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 571 F.2nd 630 (C.A.D.C. 1997) 
63 See generally McCulloch v. Md., 17 U.S. 316 (1819); See generally also McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Commission, 411 U.S. 166 (1973). 
64 See generally U.S. v. State of Me. 524 F.Supp. 1056 (D.Me. 1981).  
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for failing to negotiate in good faith with the tribe for a Tribal State gaming compact.65 
Wyoming statutes prohibit commercial gaming, but allows “any game wager or transaction” for 
persons with a social relationship and for non-profit purposes.66 Thus, the court concluded that 
the person and purpose requirements did not apply to the tribe under the IGRA and held that the 
state must negotiation with the tribes on the full gamut of casino type games.67 The case was 
upheld on and en-banc rehearing. 68 
The court detailed the two approaches to application of the IGRA good faith requirement 
to types of games that are subject to negotiation. First, the Wisconsin analysis takes a categorical 
approach, requiring the court to determine the general scope of the law.69 If the state permits any 
Class III gaming the state must negotiate with the tribe for all forms of Class III gaming because 
the state is regulating rather than prohibiting gaming.70 Second, the Florida analysis takes a game 
specific approach in which the court must determine whether the state permits a specific game at 
issue.71 Thus under the Florida approach the state must negotiate with the tribes for any games 
that it permits for any purpose but is not required to negotiate with tribes for games that it 
prohibits for all purposes.72 This distinction is important to tribes wishing to enter into new Class 
III Tribal-State compacts or expand current gaming operations to specific games that are not 
currently authorized under state law.  
V. State / Indian Tribe Gaming Compacts:  A fee or a Tax  
A. In general 
 
65 Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Of Wyoming 389 F.3d 1308, 1308 (C.A.10 Wyo.,2004) 
66 Id. at, 1311-1312  
67 Id. at 1308, 1312 (C.A.10 Wyo., 2004). 
68 See generally Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Of Wyoming, 429 F.3d 934  (C.A.10 Wyo.,  2005) 
69 See generally Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 770 F.Supp. 480 
(W.D.Wis.1991). 
70 See Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Of Wyoming 389 F.3d at 1311. 
71 See, e.g., Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 842 F.Supp. 1268, 1278 (D.Idaho 1994) (citing Seminole Tribe of Florida 
v. Florida, 1993 (S.D.Fla. Sept.22, 1993)). 
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Revenue sharing provisions contained in the various Tribal-State compacts display a 
wide range of creativity in structuring and amount.  Fees demanded by states for the right to 
engage in Class III gaming range from 3% to in excess of 25% in some cases.73 Provisions of 
exclusivity are the norm in Tribal-State compacts, but a closer look at some of the provisions 
shows that exclusivity is not always “substantial” and sometimes not even present at all.  
B. Selected State provisions  
1. California  
a. Initial Compacts 
In March of 2000 California voters passed Proposition 1A, authorizing the Governor to 
enter into Tribal- State compacts with various Indian tribes to established gaming on Indian 
lands.74 Following the passage of Proposition 1A , 61 tribes negotiated compacts with 
California.75 The compacts gave the tribes substantial exclusivity to operate Class III gaming 
slot type machines on there respective reservations in exchange for a portion of the tribes annual 
gaming revenues payable to the state run “ Indian Gaming Revenue Sharing Trust Fund”76 and 
“Special Distribution Fund.”77 Under the compacts the “Indian Gaming Revenue Sharing Trust 
Fund” was to receive annual payments totaling $1.1 million dollars collectively for per machine 
license fees payable by the individual tribes with respect to the number of machines operated.78 
72 See Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Of Wyoming 389 F.3d at 1311. 
73 Michael J. Anderson, Presentation to the 2005 Federal Bar Association, Selected Tribal-State Gaming Compact 
Revenue Sharing Provisions, pg. 371-374. (April 14-15, 2005).  (Unpublished Paper Presented at the 30th annual 
Federal Bar Association Indian Law Conference). 
74 CAL. CONST. ART IV  § 19.  
75 See CALIFORNIA GAMBLING CONTROL COMMISSION, TRIBAL-STATE COMPACT LIST, available at:
http://www.cgcca.gov/compacts/Compacted%20Tribes.htm.   
76 CAL. GOV. CODE  § 12012.75 
77 CAL. GOV. CODE  § 12012.85 
78 CALIFORNIA GAMBLING CONTROL COMMISSION, TRIBAL-STATE GAMING COMPACT BETWEEN THE FEDERALLY 
RECOGNIZED INDIAN TRIBE AND THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, at §4.3.2.1 available at:
http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/enabling/tsc.pdf [hereinafter CAL. MODEL COMPACT]; See also CAL. GOV. CODE  §
12012.75 
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The pre license fee ranges from $0 to $4350 depending on the amount of slot machines operated 
by a tribe.79 These fees collected in the “Indian Gaming Revenue Sharing Trust Fund” are 
distributed to the various non-gaming tribes of California.80 
The quarterly payments to the “Special Distribution Fund” are derived form a percentage 
of the revenue earned by the tribe’s gaming operations.81 The revenue percentages payable by 
the tribe to the “Special Distribution Fund” are base on a sliding scale and is derived from the 
number of machines operated during the relevant time period.82 The percentages range from 0% 
for up to 200 machines, 7% for 201-500, 10% for 501-1000, and 13% for machines over 1000.  
Monies from the Special Distribution Fund may be used for the following purposes:  
(a) Grants, including any administrative costs, for programs 
designed to address gambling addiction. 
(b) Grants, including any administrative costs, for the support of 
state and local government agencies impacted by tribal government 
gaming. 
(c) Compensation for regulatory costs incurred by the State Gaming 
Agency and the Department of Justice in connection with the 
implementation and administration of tribal-state gaming compacts. 
(d) Payment of shortfalls that may occur in the Indian Gaming 
Revenue Sharing Trust Fund. This shall be the priority use of moneys 
in the Indian Gaming Special Distribution Fund. 
(e) Disbursements for the purpose of implementing the terms of 
tribal labor relations ordinances promulgated in accordance with the 
terms of tribal-state gaming compacts ratified pursuant to Chapter 
874 of the Statutes of 1999. No more than 10 percent of the funds 
appropriated in the Budget Act of 2000 for implementation of tribal 
labor relations ordinances promulgated in accordance with those 
compacts shall be expended in the selection of the Tribal Labor 
Panel. The Department of Personnel Administration shall consult with 
and seek input from the parties prior to any expenditure for 
purposes of selecting the Tribal Labor Panel. Other than the cost of 
selecting the Tribal Labor Panel, there shall be no further 
disbursements until the Tribal Labor Panel, which is selected by 
 
79 Id. at  §4.3.2.2(a)(2) 
80 CAL. GOV. CODE  § 12012.75 
81CAL. MODEL COMPACT , supra note 74, at §5.0. 
82 CAL. MODEL COMPACT , supra note 74, at §5.1(a). 
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mutual agreement of the parties, is in place. 
(f) Any other purpose specified by law.83 
The statute gives priority to the payment of short falls in the Indian Gaming  Revenue 
Sharing Trust Fund, then to appropriations to the states gambling prevention programs, then to 
the State’s gambling control and regulation boards, and finally to support local governments 
impacted by gambling.84 
Even though the subsection (f) of Cal. Gov. Code. 12012.85 seems to provide the 
legislature with an open invitation to raid the fund for any purpose it sees fit, including projects 
benefiting the general welfare of the state, the federal district court has upheld the validity of the 
Special Distribution Fund on the basis that it is funded for primarily for a regulatory purposes.85 
The “Indian Gaming Revenue Sharing Trust” likewise withstood scrutiny on the basis that it was 
funded primarily in nature by licensing which is explicitly authorized under the IGRA.86 The 
11th amendment sovereign immunity restrictions on the ability of Indian Tribes to sue the states 
in the holding of the Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida do not apply in this case because 
California has waived its sovereign immunity.87 
The In re Gaming Related Cases seems to reach the right result regarding the Indian 
Gaming Revenue sharing fund, because as the court notes the fund is directly related to the 
compensation of non-gaming tribes by gaming tribes for their non use of the limited amount of 
licenses available for Indian gaming in California.88 In regard to the Special Distribution Fund, 
the court applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis to construe the compacts general appropriation 
 
83 CAL GOV. CODE § 12012.85(A)-(F). 
84 CAL. GOV. CODE § 12012.85(G). 
85 See In re Indian Gaming Related Cases, 147 F.Supp.2d 1011, 1016 (2001); See also Lent, supra note 7, at 452 
(2003) for analysis of the California gaming cases upholding both funds due to their licensing and regulatory 
purposes despite the open ended spending provisions). 
86 Id.; see also 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710 (d)(3)(C)(i). 
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term in section 5.2(e) of the compact as authorizing other expenditures only in the related areas 
of enumerated specifically in the section 5.2.89 However, given the definition of a tax and fee 
discuss above in Part III.B. supra, one must question whether the amounts exacted from tribe 
bear a proportional relationship to the cost borne by the State.90 Unfortunately the court did not 
reach this argument and the author can only speculate that had the court decided the case on this 
ground it may have reached a different conclusion.   This argument is growing in importance’s as 
California continues to up the ante on the amounts required under new and renegotiated Tribal-
State compacts.  
b. New Developments 
In June of 2004, the State of California renegotiated Tribal State Compacts with five 
Indian Tribes.91 The terms of these Compacts include a $1 billion dollar payment to be financed 
over 18 years.  This initial $1 billion dollar one time payment figure is derived from estimating 
the sum of the annual payments of $100 million dollars required by the tribes over 18 years 
which represents 10% of current net wins (up to 18% of tribal net profits on casinos).92 This 
payment is purported to be consideration for exclusivity from non-Indian competitors and subject 
to the use restrictions in Cal Gov. Code § 12012.85. Following the repayment of the bond the 
tribes will be expected to contributed annual payments expected to total an additional $700 
million dollars collectively over the life of the contract.93 
87 See Cal Gov't Code § 98005. 
88 In re Indian Gaming Related Cases, 147 f.Supp.2d at 1018. 
89 Id. 
90 See generally, U.S. v. State of Me. 524 F.Supp. 1056 (D.Me. 1981). 
91 Governor Schwarzenegger Signs ReNegotiated Gaming Compacts With Five Indian Tribes, Press Release, 
(6/21/2004) available at: http://www.governor.ca.gov/state/govsite/gov_html (last viewed 5-22-2006).  
92 See Id; See also § 4.3.3 of each of the amended contracts, available at: http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/compacts (last 
viewed 5-22-2006). 
93 Id. 
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Furthermore these new contracts will increase the cost under the progressive rate 
schedule for annual slot machines licenses up to $25,000 per additional machine allowed above 
the current limits of 2000 representing an estimated additional 15% of net wins on such 
additional machines for certain tribes.94 Additionally, contributions to the “Indian Gaming 
Revenue Sharing Trust Fund” will increase to $2 million per year collectively.  For example the 
Rumesy Band of Wintun Indians’ Tribal-State compact calls for payments to the Revenue 
Sharing Trust Fund in the amount of: 
Additional Gaming Devices in Operation  Annual Fee Per Gaming Device 
(i) 1,763 to 2,000     $11,000 
(ii) 2,001 to 2,500    $12,000 
(iii) 2,501 to 3,000    $13,200 
(iv) 3,001 to 3,500    $17,000 
(v) 3,501 to 4,000    $20,000 
(vi) 4,001 to 4,500    $22,500 
(vii) 4,500 and above    $25,00095 
Several new compacts were also negotiated. For example, Section 5.2 of the Fort Mojave 
Indians Tribal-State compact calls for no payment to the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund for under 
700 machines, a payment of $900 per machine for 701 to 1100 machines, and $1950 for 1101 to 
1500 machines but only if the tribe earns over $25 million.96 The fee schedule in section 4.3.1 for 
payments to the Special Distribution Fund are: 
(i) As long as the Tribe has over 1,000 members, its payment of the 
Net Win shall be based on the following schedule: 
94 See AMENDMENT TO THE TRIBAL-STATE COMPACT BETWEEN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND THE PALA BAND OF 
MISSION INDIANS, at  §4.3.1, available at: http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/compacts/Pala%20amendment.pdf (last viewed 
5-22-2006). 
95 AMENDMENT TO THE TRIBAL-STATE GAMING COMPACT BETWEEN THE RUMSEY BAND OF WINTUN INDIANS, A
FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED INDIAN TRIBE, AND THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, § 5.2, available at: 
http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/compacts/Rumsey%20amendment.pdf  (last viewed 5-29-06). 
96 TRIBAL-STATE GAMING COMPACT BETWEEN THE FORT MOJAVE INDIAN TRIBE, A FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED 
INDIAN TRIBE, AND THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, § 5.2, available at 
http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/compacts/fort_mojave_compact.pdf  (last viewed 5-29-06). 
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Annual Net Win Percentage 
$0-$50 million 10% 
Over $50 million to $100 million 14% 
Over $100 million to $150 million 18% 
Over $150 million to $200 million 22% 
Over $200 million 25% 
 
(ii) If the Tribe’s membership falls between 500 and 1000 members, 
its payment of the Net Win shall be based on the following schedule: 
Annual Net Win Percentage 
$0-$50 million 11% 
Over $50 million to $100 million 15% 
Over $100 million to $150 million 18% 
Over $150 million to $200 million 22% 
Over $200 million 25%97 
In the above compact, one can hardly see the relationship between the state’s charging inversely 
proportionate higher percentages of net wins when resulting lower tribal membership occurs to 
the state’s purported justification of exclusivity or defraying regulatory costs. This provision 
creates the appearance that the state of California wants a bigger piece of the pie when wealth 
may be consolidated among fewer tribal members.  
In June 2005, Governor Swhwarzenegger negotiated new amendments to the existing 
Tribal-State compacts with the Quechan and Yurok tribes.98 The 2005 compacts include 
provisions for tribal contribution to the State ranging from 10% to 25% of net wins based on a 
sliding scale.99 The state will receive 10% of the first $50 million net win, 14% of the $50-$100 
million net win, 18% of the $100 to $150 million net win, 22% of the $150-$200 million net win 
 
97 Id. at § 4.3.1. 
98 Governor Swharzenegger Announces Indian Gaming Agreements, press release (6-16-2005) available at: 
http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/compacts/Quechan%20and%20Fort%20Yuma%20Compacts_061605.pdf (last viewed 5-
22-2006)[hereinafter Cal. Indian Gaming Release 2]. 
99 Cal. Indian Gaming Release 2, supra note 94; See also AMENDMENT TO THE TRIBAL-STATE COMPACT BETWEEN 
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND THE YUROK TRIBE, available at 
http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/compacts/Yurok_Compact.pdf; See ALSO AMENDMENT TO THE TRIBAL-STATE COMPACT 
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and 25% of the net win over $250 million.100 Interestingly the amendment to the Quechan 
compacts have a provision in which the percentage reaped by the state on the initial $50 million 
net win increase from 10% to 12% if tribal membership falls below 2500.101 Additionally the 
Quechan contract contains a provision committing the tribe to a payment of $900 dollars to non 
gaming tribes for each gaming devices operated in excess of 700 machines, if the Tribe earns 
more that $75 million annually.102 
The compacts also contain various labor, liability, insurance, and notice provisions as 
well as the right to cease payments if the a non tribal entity legally offers slot machines with in 
55 miles of the tribes casinos.103 
2. Michigan  
In 1990 pursuant to the IGRA, 25 USCA § 2710 (d)(3)(A) six tribes in the state of 
Michigan filed an action against the Governor of Michigan for failing to negotiate in good 
faith.104 In 1993 after three years of litigation the court entered a Consent Judgement with the 
contingent upon the approval of Class III gaming Tribal-State compacts by DOI.105 The Consent 
Judgements provided that the tribes would pay the State of Michigan 8% of net wins and local 
governments 2% of net wins from slot machines operated pursuant to the compacts.106 These 
provisions were placed in the Consent Judgement and  not contained in the tribal state compacts 
 
BETWEEN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND THE QUECHAN TRIBE, available at: 
http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/compacts/Quechan_Compact 
100 Cal. Indian Gaming Release 2, supra note 94 
101 Apparently this provision is intended to prevent the increase in tribal per capita distributions in the event of 
decreased membership rolls by increasing the required distribution to the state. 
102 Cal. Indian Gaming Release 2, supra note 94; See also AMENDMENT TO THE TRIBAL-STATE COMPACT BETWEEN 
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND THE QUECHAN TRIBE.
103 Cal. Indian Gaming Release 2, supra note 94; See also: AMENDMENT TO THE TRIBAL-STATE COMPACT BETWEEN 
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND THE YUROK TRIBE; See also AMENDMENT TO THE TRIBAL-STATE COMPACT 
BETWEEN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND THE QUECHAN TRIBE.
104 Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, Governor of Michigan, 93 F. Sup. 2d at 851 
105Id.; THE MICHIGAN GAMING LAW WEBSITE, MICHIGAN GAMING: OVERVIEW, available at: 
http://www.michigangaming.com/Overview.html#over-Indian (last viewed on 5-23-06). 
106 Id. 
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presumably to avoid scrutiny by the DOI and characterization as an improper tax on Indian 
Gaming under the IGRA of the local payments which were pegged to local tax rates.107 The 
Consent Judgment also contained an exclusivity provision that invalidated the tribes obligation to 
make payments to the state in the event that additional licenses were authorized by the state to 
engage in Class III gaming in the state of Michigan.108 
In 1996 voters in the state of Michigan passed “Proposition E” resulting in the Gaming 
Control and Revenue Act which authorized the construction and operation 3 privately owned 
casinos in Detroit.109 Shortly thereafter the Tribes ceased making payments and sued the State of 
Michigan in Federal court for declaratory judgment invalidating the provisions requiring 
payments.110 The court held that the mere enactment of the law was insufficient to infringe on 
the tribes’ exclusivity.111 However, in 1998, when the governor entered into Tribal-State 
compacts with four new tribes, and the original seven threatened to cease payments, and  actually 
did so in February 1999 when the new compacts took effect. The governor filed a motion to 
compel payment.112 This time the court held that the exclusivity provisions of the original 
contracts had been violated.113 The tribes no longer had to make the 8% payments to the state 
but it did up hold the 2% revenue sharing provisions with local governments because they were 
not conditioned on substantial exclusivity.114 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, Governor of Michigan, 93 F. Sup. 2d at 851; See also 
MICHIGAN GAMING CONTROL AND REVEUE ACT, MICH. COMP. LAWS §432.201-226 (2006); See also THE MICHIGAN 
GAMING LAW WEBSITE, supra note 105; See also Lent, supra note 7, at 452 (2003). 
110 Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, Governor of Michigan, 93 F. Sup. 2d at 851 
111 Id. at 853. 
112 Id. at 853-855. 
113 Id. 93 F. Sup. 2d at 855. 
114 See Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, Governor of Michigan, Consent Judgment, Civil No. 
1:90 CV 611, paras 6,8, available at:
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/SSM_v_Engler_Stip_Consent_70619_7.pdf (last viewed 5-23-06); See also; 
Lent, supra note 7, at 459 (2003). 
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The new 1998 compacts contain a limited exclusivity clause that the 8% payments due 
under the compact were conditioned upon no other entities being authorized to conduct gaming 
operations except for the other tribes and the three casinos in Detroit.115 Nine tribes currently 
operate 17 casinos in Michigan most of which are located in the Upper Peninsula.116 Substantial 
Exclusivity seems to be the mode for avoiding characterization of the revenue sharing 
agreements as a tax.  Although one must question, the substantiality of the exclusivity Michigan 
offers.  
3. New Mexico 
Twelve tribes negotiated Tribal-State compacts with New Mexico in 1997 that contained 
a revenue sharing provision providing for 16% of slot machine net revenues.117 The Secretary of 
the DOI expressed concerns about the lack of a substantial exclusivity agreement, considering 
the compacts allowed the state to authorize a state lottery, and many types of fraternal and 
charitable organizations to operate gaming devices as well as allowing the operation of gaming 
devices at racetracks.118 But the DOI to no action and let the waiting period expire at the request 
of the tribes, and the compacts were approved by default.119 The tribes signed the agreements 
despite their displeasure with the terms in hopes of arbitrating the agreement to obtain terms that 
were more favorable to them.120 The tribes deposited the amounts due under the revenue sharing 
agreements in escrow and in 2001 after years of litigation all but two of the tribes had settled 
 
115COMPACT  BETWEEN THE  THE NOTTAWASEPPI HURON BAND OF POTAWATOMI 
AND THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, § 17 (a)-(c), available at:
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/NHB_Compact_70601_7.pdf (last viewed on 5-23-06). 
116 also THE MICHIGAN GAMING LAW WEBSITE, supra note 105 
117 Lent, supra note 7, at 452 (2003). 
118 See Grover, supra note 29, part III.B.3. 
119 STATE OF NEW MEXICO GAMING CONTROL BOARD, NEW MEXICO GAMING HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, available 
at: http://www.nmgcb.org/tribal/history.htm (last viewed 5-22-06); See also Grover, supra note 29, part III.B.3.  
120 See Lent, supra note 7, at fn. 84. 
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their disputes and entered into new gaming contracts.121 In 2004 the Mescalero Apache Tribe 
settle and in 2005 the Pueblo of Pojoaque tribe also settled their case and both entered into the 
new compacts.122 
The new Tribal State compacts reduce the revenue sharing provision to 8%.123 But the 
compact still contain similar provisions allowing the state to authorize fraternal and charitable 
organizations, and even race tracks, to engage in the operation of class III gaming machines.124 
The DOI approved the compacts (notwithstanding the obvious lack of exclusivity) citing that the 
geographic area of exclusivity was sufficient. 125 
4. Arizona   
Governor Hull began negotiating the renewal of Tribal-State compacts in Arizona in 
2000, which after some litigation, concluded in 2002, and by 2003 Governor Napolitano and six 
tribes signed the new standard form contract.126 The Arizona standard form contract provides for 
a graduated revenue sharing agreement. The Tribal contributions are purportedly consideration in 
exchange for substantial exclusivity covenants with the state.  The amount of the tribe’s class III 
net wins to be contributed amount to: 
(1) One percent (1%) of the first twenty-five million dollars ($25,000,000.00); 
(2) Three percent (3%) of the next fifty million dollars ($50,000,000.00); 
(3) Six percent (6%) of the next twenty-five million dollars ($25,000,000.00)  
(4) Eight percent (8%) of Class III Net Win in excess of one hundred million 
dollars ($100,000,000.00).127 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 STATE OF NEW MEXICO GAMING CONTROL BOARD, PROPOSED TRIBAL STATE CLASS III GAMING COMPACT, § 11 
(C) (2), available at: http://www.nmgcb.org/tribal/adv_ops/2006-1.pdf (last viewed 5-22-06). 
124 Id. at § 11 (D) (2) (a)-(d). 
125 DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, LETTER FROM NEAL A. MCCALEB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INDIAN AFFAIRS 
TO THE HONORABLE GARY JOHNSON, GOVERNOR OF NEW MEXICO (Nov. 21 2001). 
126 ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF GAMING, TIMELINE, available at: http:// www.gm.state.az.us/timeline.htm (last 
viewed 5/17/06).  
127 ARIZONA TRIBAL SATE COMPACT, § 12 (b), available at: http:// www.gm.state.az.us/compact/final.pdf (last 
viewed 5/17/06).  
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Tribal Contributions received by Arizona under the compact are distributed to special 
social welfare funds created by statute.128 The Tribe is required to make 12% of their respective 
revenue sharing distribution directly to local towns, cities, and counties “for governmental 
services that benefit the general public, including public safety, mitigation of impacts of gaming, 
or promotion of commerce and economic development” or the Commerce and Economic 
Development Commission Local Comminutes Fund.129 The Tribe must distribute the remaining 
88% of its required contribution to the Arizona Benefits Fund.130 The monies contributed to this 
fund are distributed according to A.R.S. §5-601.02. Section (H) provides: 
3. Monies in the Arizona benefits fund, including all investment earnings, shall be 
allocated as follows: 
(a)(i) Eight million dollars or nine percent, whichever is greater, shall be used for 
reimbursement of administrative and regulatory expenses, including expenses for 
development of and access to any online electronic game management systems 
and for law enforcement activities incurred by the department of gaming pursuant 
to this chapter. Any monies that are allocated pursuant to this sub § 3(a) that are 
not appropriated to the department of gaming shall be deposited in the 
instructional improvement fund established by section 15-979. 
(ii) Two percent shall be used by the department of gaming to fund state and local 
programs for the prevention and treatment of, and education concerning, problem 
gambling. 
(b) Of the monies in the Arizona benefits fund that are not allocated pursuant to 
subdivision (a): 
(i) Fifty-six percent shall be deposited in the instructional improvement fund 
established by section 15-979 for use by school districts for classroom size 
reduction, teacher salary increases, dropout prevention programs, and 
instructional improvement programs. 
(ii) Twenty-eight percent shall be deposited in the trauma and emergency services 
fund established by § 36-2903.07. 
(iii) Eight percent shall be deposited in the Arizona wildlife conservation fund 
established by § 17-299. 
(iv) Eight percent shall be deposited in the tourism fund account established by 
paragraph 4 of subsection A of § 41-2306 for statewide tourism promotion.131 
128 Id.; See also A.R.S. §5-601.02(H) (2006); See also A.R.S. § 41-1505.12 (2006). 
129 ARIZONA TRIBAL SATE COMPACT, § 12 (b); See also A.R.S. § 41-1505.12.  
130 A.R.S §5-601.02(H) (2006). 
131 Id. at (H)(3). 
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The final sentence of this paragraph state that “ the State shall not impose any tax, fee, 
charge, or other assessment upon the Tribe’s Gaming Operations.”132 However maybe it should 
read no other tax, will be levied because the A.R.S. §5-601.02(H)(3) provisions obviously 
allocate monies for the general support of the welfare of the state, and that, possess all the 
incidences of a tax.   
5. Oklahoma --  The compact machine approach 
In November of 2004 Oklahoma voters approved the Legislature referred “State-Tribal 
Gaming Act.”133 The following year 29 tribes entered into Class III Tribal-State gaming 
compacts with Oklahoma.134 The compacts provide tribes with “substantial exclusivity” in 
exchange for fee of 4% of the first $10,000,000 of adjusted gross revenues from slot machines, 
5% of the next $10,000,000 of adjusted gross revenues from slot machines, and 6% of all of 
adjusted gross revenues from slot machines above $20,000,000.135 The compact also requires a 
fee of 10% of adjusted gross revenues from non-house banked common pool type games such as 
Texas hold ’em poker games.136 In addition to the monthly payments of the percent of net 
revenues discussed above the tribes must also pay a $50,000 initial start up fee for administration 
and oversight expenses.137 The revenues received from tribal gaming and race track facilities go 
predominately towards primary and secondary education with 12% going towards scholarships 
for children of low income families attending post secondary education programs.138 
132 ARIZONA TRIBAL SATE COMPACT, § 12 (c). 
133 OKLAHOMA TRIBAL-STATE GAMING COMPACT STATE COMPLIANCE AGENCY (SCA), available at:
http://www.ok.gov/OGC/About_Tribal-State_Gaming_Compliance_Unit/ (last viewed 5-23-04) 
134 OKLAHOMA OFFICE OF STATE FINANCE GAMING COMPLIANCE UNIT, COMPACTED TRIBES, available at:
http://www.ok.gov/OGC/Compacted_Tribes/index.html (last viewed on 5-24-06). 
135 MODEL TRIBAL GAMING COMPACT BETWEEN THE _____ TRIBE AND THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, part 11. A. 2. a., 
available at: http://www.ok.gov/OGC/documents/Model%20Compact.pdf (last viewed on 5-24-06) 
136 Id. at  part 11. A. 2. b. 
137 Id. at,  part 11. C. 
138 See Racino Revenues Fall Off Pace, available at:: http://www.kotv.com/news/?97850 (last viewed 5-23-06). 
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The exclusivity clause provides that if a state authorizes a non-tribal entity to participate 
in Class III gaming with in 45 miles of the tribes gaming facility the state must assess a fee 50% 
of gross revenues on the newly established non-tribal entity and remit that portion to the tribe as 
liquidated damages.139 Furthermore, tribes agree not to located gaming facilities with in 20 miles 
of another recipient of a Class III tribal gaming license.140 
Every electronic game and play must be recorded to ensure compliance with the act.141 
Following every play on a terminal, the data must be maintained electronically via an electronic 
accounting system142 and viewable electronically or via printed report and must include basic 
information including the amount paid in, the game played and the result and prize awarded.143 
The state law requiring these so called “compacted games” are unique in the area of tribal 
gaming, however, as of the beginning of 2006 many tribes have yet to install such machines, in 
fact, the Apache Nation of Oklahoma’s casino which opened up on May 9, 2006 was the first 
fully compacted casino in the state.144 
6. Louisiana 
In Louisiana the Jean Band of Choctaw Indians and the state entered into a compact in 
2002 that was disapproved because the revenues sharing agreement in the compact reflected that 
which was imposed as a tax on state sanctioned commercial river boats.145 
7. Ohio – The New Battle Ground State 
A noteworthy development in recent years has been the attempt to move Indian gaming 
to off reservation locations in municipalities.  The attempts to expand tribal gaming activities to 
 
139 MODEL TRIBAL GAMING COMPACT BETWEEN THE _____ TRIBE AND THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, part 11. E. 
140 Id. at,  part 11. A. F. 
141 O. S. § 270 (D) (2006). 
142 Id. 
143 O. S. § 271 (5)(B) (2006). 
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off reservation facilities have generated a fervor of debate among tribes, politicians, scholars, and 
the public. Some commentators question the social cost of gambling with regard to rapid pace of 
expansion in tribal and state-sanctioned gaming.146 “[T]he availability of gambling is linked to 
an increase in problem gambling [which] is linked to a wide variety of social problems and 
crimes. This indicates that if access to gambling is limited, an area will not experience the social 
and criminal problem associated to cities and states with legal forms of gambling.”147 In 
Ohio,“[l]egal slot machines and casinos have been proposed by politicians to solve the state's 
financial problems and rejuvenate waning interest in horse racing. . . . [I]f casino and slot 
machine initiatives fail, the racetracks in Ohio will soon be forced to close their doors.”148 
As of 2006, Ohio allows pari-mutuel betting at horse racetracks, and a state and 
multistate lottery but does not allow any casino type games.149 Moreover, Ohio currently does 
not have any federally recognized tribes with lands in trust located in Ohio upon which Indian 
gaming could be conducted.  In fact, the IGRA prohibits tribal gaming on land acquired in trust 
after the statutes enactment in October 17, 1988, however, there are several exceptions provided 
in the statute.150 The first exception applies if the tribe did not have a reservation as of the above 
date.151 The second exception applies if a federally recognized tribe and a state agree to permit 
gaming on newly acquired lands, but only if the Governor of the state consents.152 Finally the 
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150 Id at 240; See also 25 U.S.C. § 2719(a)-(a) 
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relevant exception (currently faced by Ohio) provides that lands placed in trust for a federally 
recognized tribe pursuant to the settlement of a land claim or established as the initial reservation 
of an Indian tribe recently acknowledged by the secretary may be used for tribal gaming.153 
Current measures to introduce Indian Gaming in Ohio include an attempt by the Eastern 
Shawnee tribe of Oklahoma to establish gaming facilities in several Ohio counties which are 
currently not part of any an Indian Reservation but are the subject of a broad based tribal land-
claim.154 The tribe has already signed casino agreements with several communities in 
anticipation of a favorable decision on its land clam.  However the Supreme Courts decision in 
The City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York __  S.Ct. __  no. 03-885 reversing and 
remanding 337 F.3rd 139 in which the court denied of the tribes land claim citing doctrine of 
latches and the length of time between the time the claim arose and filing as acting as a waiver of 
the tribe’s claim and their sovereign rights over the territory.  The recent denial of certiorari in 
Cayuga Indian Nation of NY. v. Pataki __ S.Ct. ___, 2006 WL 283872., has all but foreclosed 
other tribes’ land claims such as the one in Ohio by the Eastern Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma.155 
Off reservation gaming measures have yet to be approved in Ohio and battle ground 
states such as it will likely be at the for front of the tribal gaming debate in the years to come. 
However, moves to initiate off reservation gaming have been under taken in California and most 
recently Barstow, Oklahoma.156 
VI. Conclusion 
A. A View to The Future 
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The current trend of states to demand an increasing share of net wins form tribes under 
newly negotiated or renegotiated Tribal-State has prompted some tribes to diversify their 
operations from strictly casinos to other for profit activities.157 The Tulalip Tribe of Washington 
has chartered its own City, Quil Ceda village that is home to shopping, gaming and hospitality 
businesses.158 Quil Ceda is locate on the reservation and is the first federally charted 
municipality since the District of Columbia.159 The tribes issued tax-exempt bonds pursuant to 
the Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act of 1982 to finance projects developing the 
infrastructure around Quil Ceda.160 The IRS issued a ruling “that Quil Ceda, as a wholly 
controlled political subdivision of qualifying tribes, has the authority to issue bonds.”161 The 
incorporation offers many advantages, such has fending off attempts to annex Indian lands, 
creating investment incentives for outside business to enter Quil Ceda without binding the entire 
tribe, and keeping the remainder of the reservation rural.162 Although the city is located within a 
reservation, retailers who lease parcels are still subject to state sales taxation by virtue of federal 
law.163 Tribal members are currently lobbing for the return of some of the sales tax revenues 
generated at Quil Ceda to the reservation in the form of a revenue sharing bill, but efforts have 
fall short as of early 2006, however a lawsuit against the state is a possibility. 164 
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The incorporation of Quil Ceda is a monument to the IGRA’s aspiration goals of 
fostering tribal independence.165 Nevertheless, Quil Ceda is not the only venture the Tulalip 
tribe has started with casino profits, It also operates a for profit public golf course.166 
Additionally the Casino revenues have help the tribe expand current tribal infrastructure 
including the construction of a foster home, assisted living center for elders, and a tribal health 
center.167 
B. In Summary 
As tribal gaming facilities increase in number and move off traditional reservations, the 
attempt to characterize state fees as bargained for consideration or improper taxes will become 
even more convoluted due to minimal guidance by the courts in this area. The growing trend of 
many states to structure revenue sharing agreements in the form of graduated scales based on 
percentages of net wins makes it hard to argue that the fees charged by states bear any rational 
relationship to services they provide.168 Furthermore, the increasing amounts of the percentages 
of net wins demanded by states (such as California) only further attenuates the argument that the 
amounts charged are not taxes but rather reimbursement for regulatory costs. Finally the growing 
number of compacts entered into with Tribal entities in states such as California, Michigan, 
Oklahoma, and Mississippi which have authorized non-tribal entities to compete with tribes in 
the gaming industries (albeit geographically limited) displaces their argument that the revenue 
sharing provisions represent payment for a valuable service (providing substantial exclusivity) 
from the state rather than a guise for an unauthorized tax.   
 
165 25 U.S.C.A § 2701 (4); 25 U.S.C.A § 2702 (1). 
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The erosion of the tribal bargaining chip of threat of lawsuit has likely vanquished any 
hope of good faith negotiations.169 However, the IGRA has left a gaping loophole for tribes to 
enter into states without a reservation, and as the casinos come to the few states that have cashed 
in, we are likely to see more pillaging of Indian profits.  In any event, many states are poised to 
continue to reap the immense benefits of Tribal gaming until the trend folds.  This author can 
only hope that more tribes follow the lead of the Tulalip Tribe of Washington and establish self-
sufficiency before the luck runs out on the roll with the Indian Casino.    
 
169 See generally Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44.  
